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This article adds new insights into the relationship between founders’ human capital and the survival prospects of start-
up businesses. The impact of founders’ human capital on firm survival is controversial. On one hand, more experienced 
and skilled individuals are likely to create start-up businesses with a high chance of survival; on the other hand, their 
opportunity costs to run the  firm  may be  high given the potential returns for investing their efforts in alternative 
employment opportunities. Analysing a sample of 179 Italian start-up companies created during 1995-early 2000 and 
operating in ICT services markets, this study provides evidence that, in intense industry crises (early 2000-2003), highly 
work experienced entrepreneurs may pursue an exit strategy and highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
different types of work experience and different exit routes. In particular, founding teams with highly specific work 
experience show higher probability of following the M&A route, while a higher level of generic work experience is 
more conducive to closure. 
 
Keywords: High-tech entrepreneurship; Start-up exit; Founders’ human capital; ICT 





In the wide-ranging literature on the determinants of firm survival (see, e.g., Caves 1998 for a 
survey on main findings), the relationship between founders’ human capital and survival prospects 
of young firms has not attracted a great deal of attention. In theoretical terms, the impact of founder 
human  capital  on  firm  survival  is  controversial.  On  one  hand,  more  experienced  and  skilled 
individuals are more likely to create start-up companies with a high chance of survival; on the other 
hand, their opportunity costs to run the firm may be high given the potential returns for investing 
their efforts in alternative employment opportunities. Furthermore, highly skilled entrepreneurs may 
prefer  to  specialize  in  the  entrepreneurial  function,  thus  being  more  likely  than  untalented 
entrepreneurs to develop businesses of high quality and more likely to transfer them through sale or 
merger operations (see, e.g., Holmes and Schmitz 1990, 1995). The relationship between founders’ 
human capital and young firm survival may also be influenced and moderated by several factors: 
the  specific  characteristics  of  the  human  capital  considered,  the  type  of  exit,  the  specific  time   2 
period, firm age range, and the industrial sector under scrutiny. From an empirical point of view 
(see, e.g., Delmar and Shane 2006 for a survey), the general contention is that founders’ human 
capital positively affects firm survival prospects (Delmar and Shane 2006; Santarelli and Vivarelli 
2007), but in fact the available evidence is far from being conclusive. The first large-scale empirical 
study on the topic was reported by Bates (1990). His analysis of young business longevity for a 
sample of U.S. single-founded firms revealed that entrepreneur education was a major determinant 
of firm survival, but that managerial competencies did not exert any significant role. Since then a 
number of econometric analyses have tried to document a positive relationship between various 
measures of founders’ human capital and survival, with heterogeneous results. Considering only the 
most prominent works, many studies found a significant positive impact on firm survival for only 
some of several measures of owners’ human capital investigated (Brüderl et al. 1992; Cooper et al. 
1994;  Gimeno  et  al.  1997;  Pennings  et  al.  1998;  Taylor  1999;  Van  Praag  2003;  Åstebro  and 
Bernhardt 2003; Thompson 2005; Delmar and Shane 2006), while others did not document any 
significant effect at all or highlighted the presence of a negative relationship (Bates 1989; Nafziger 
and Terrel 1996; Cressy 1996; Storey and Wynarczyk 1996; Shane and Stuart 2002). 
As suggested by Gimeno et al. (1997, p. 756) “there may be situations in which entrepreneurs 
do not continue their business even though, in terms of economic performance, they are better off 
than other entrepreneurs. They may take this action because of the opportunity costs associated with 
staying in business – their level of education and training may warrant more attractive economic 
returns  in  alternative  employment  opportunities.  Similarly,  a  poorly  performing  venture  may 
continue because of the entrepreneur’s lack of other attractive options, strong physical attachment to 
the  new  venture,  or  high  costs  associated  with  switching  into  new  employment.”  Quoting  also 
McGrath (1999, p. 14): “an entrepreneur might disband an economically profitable business if other 
activities appear more lucrative or interesting”. More recently, Bates (2005) pointed out that closure 
may  not  be  regarded  as  synonymous  with  failure,  highlighting  that  more  educated  and  skilled 
owners  may  decide  to  discontinue  operations  of  enterprises  that  are  still  successful  because 
something more attractive has come along (in the same vein see also Watson and Everett 1993, 
1996; Headd 2003, DeTienne et al. 2008). In other words, high-profile human capital characteristics 
may raise the opportunity costs of running the firm, as the entrepreneur may receive higher returns 
from switching to alternative occupations. 
This work is much in the spirit of Gimeno et al. (1997) and the reasoning of Bates (2005). 
Considering the exit behaviour during the telecom and dot.com bust from early 2000 to 2003 for a 
sample of Italian ICT start-up companies created during the boom period of 1995 to early 2000,
1 
this empirical analysis suggests that founders’ pre-entry professional experience may negatively   3 
affect firm survival during a severe industry recession. Moreover, it shows that the exit route chosen 
may depend on the nature of the work experience of entrepreneurs. In particular, over the “tough 
time” of early 2000 to 2003, ICT entrepreneurs with a high level of specific work experience (i.e., 
gained in the same sector as the start-up company) have more intensively pursued an “exit strategy” 
through the merger and acquisition (M&A) channel, while founding teams with a high level of 
generic work experience (i.e., gained in other sectors) have been more likely to close down their 
start-up firm.
2  
In so doing, the paper adds to the extant literature on young firm dynamics in different respects. 
First, it highlights that founders’ human capital affects new venture survival prospects, but not 
necessarily in a positive way. During a very intense industry-specific negative shock, a high level of 
human capital and the associated level of outside options may represent a life line for entrepreneurs 
aiming at escaping the industry crisis effects. Second, it stresses the importance when it comes to 
explain firm survival through founders’ human capital of discriminating both between different 
typology of competencies possessed by entrepreneurs and between different exit routes. As to this 
latter  aspect,  the  results  of  this  study  suggest  that  considering  plain  survival  as  a  measure  of 
performance  may  be  somehow  misleading  for  what  concerns  young  firms  operating  in 
technologically intensive industries and turbulent markets.  
 
Theoretical  hypotheses 
Founders’ human capital is a primary asset for new firms (Chandler and Hanks 1994; Peteraf 
and Shanley 1997; Reuber and Fischer 1999; van Praag 2003), in particular for high-technology 
start-ups  (Cooper  and  Bruno  1997;  Feeser  and  Willard  1990).
3  Valuable  business  projects  are 
introduced into markets by more competent entrepreneurs and in general founders’ human capital 
strongly and positively affects the performance of young firms. In this context, especially for high-
technology sectors, the distinction between specific and generic founders’ human capital is highly 
relevant. In fact, what really seems to matter in shaping the prospects and performance of start-up 
firms in high-technology sectors is the specific rather than the generic component of human capital 
(Feeser and Willard 1990; Colombo et al. 2004; Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2008). However, if the 
relatively superior contribution of specific compared to generic human capital is expected to hold 
regardless of the industry conditions under which young firms operate, it is clear that the overall 
scenario influences absolute performance. Young and small firms are generally more exposed to the 
effects of industry crises. Allegedly they are more likely to be forced or willing to look for a way to 
overcome a sector-specific recession.   4 
A heuristic model of the relationships between founders’ pre-entry work experience and firm 
exit routes during an intense industry-specific negative shock is conceptualised in Figure 1. The 
focus is on previous entrepreneurial work experience, which is one of the most relevant of founders’ 
human  capital  characteristics  in  shaping  the  actual  viability  and  future  prospects  of  business 
projects in high-technology markets. 
Two  main  characteristics  affect  the  relationship  between  entrepreneurial  pre-entry  work 
experience and firm exit decisions during industry recession: the level of personal outside options 
available to entrepreneurs to escape the industry crisis and the economic value of the ICT business 
project implemented on start-up. For the former, a large body of literature on the employee turnover 
process  (see,  e.g.,  Griffeth  and  Hom  1995  for  a  survey)  provides  evidence  that  human  capital 
increases the range of personal options available to an individual and raises the opportunity cost of 
her  time.  In  our  context,  this  implies  that,  everything  else  being  equal,  highly  experienced 
entrepreneurs might be more willing to search for alternatives and be more likely to succeed in their 
search. Clearly, the specific negative ICT market conditions considered here and the focus on young 
start-ups strengthen this possibility. Especially in firm infancy stages, when entrepreneurs have not 
developed any strong psychological commitment to the firm, an “alternative reason” for firm exit 
(see Maertz and Campion 2004; DeTienne 2008) may be particularly relevant during an industry-
specific recession. 
The idea that, all else being equal, entrepreneurs with a high level of work experience gained 
in the same industry (i.e., specific work experience) are more likely to base their entrepreneurial 
ventures on innovative and profitable business ideas is well established (see, e.g., Venkataraman 
1997; von Hippel 1988; Klepper 2001; Shane 2003). Shane (2000), using eight case studies of 
ventures exploiting a single MIT invention (three-dimensional printing), demonstrates that specific 
industry, business and market experience are all fundamental drivers of entrepreneurial discovery 
and exploitation of opportunities. Shepherd and DeTienne (2005), using a sample of MBA students, 
report  that  previous  detailed  knowledge  of  customer  problems  leads  to  an  increase  in  the 
identification of the number and innovativeness of business opportunities. Marvel and Lumpkin 
(2007),  analysing  a  sample  of  145  technology  entrepreneurs  operating  within  US  university-
affiliated incubators, show that specific and extensive knowledge of the technology at the heart of 
the business is a major determinant of the introduction of more radical innovations into markets. 
Quite reasonably, founders with a high level of specific work experience usually also achieve better 
performance than other entrepreneurs. Brüderl et al. (1992) document a significantly lower failure 
rate for Bavarian new firms if the founders have business experience in the same sector. Cooper et 
al. (1994) find that industry-specific know-how contributes to both the survival and growth of their   5 
sample firms. Siegel et al. (1993) show that in a sample of approximately 1600 Pennsylvania start-
ups, the fact that the entrepreneurial team had prior experience in the same industry of the new firm 
was the only discriminating factor between high- and low-growth firms. Similarly, Gimeno et al. 
(1997) highlight a strong positive association between the post-entry performance of new firms and 
an index capturing the similarity of customers, suppliers, and products/services between the new 
firm and the organisation in which entrepreneurs were previously employed. Chandler and Jensen 
(1992) also find that similarity between the business of the new firm and that of the incubating 
organisation  has  a  positive  impact  on  growth.  Cooper  and  Bruno  (1977)  consider  young  high-
technology firms located on the San Francisco Peninsula in the 1970s. They show that high-growth 
firms  were  more  likely  than  exit  firms  to  have  been  founded  by  individuals  from  incubating 
organisations that operated in the same industry as the new firm. Similarly, Feeser and Willard 
(1990), comparing 39 high-growth computer producers with a matching set of low-growth firms, 
show that the former are more likely than the latter to have products, markets and technologies 
closely related to those of their founders’ incubating organisation. Finally, analysis by Colombo and 
Grilli (2005, 2008) of a sample of Italian new technology-based firms reveals that years of specific 
work experience of the founders is an important predictor of firm growth. 
During a very intense recession, such as the one experienced by the ICT sector in the time-
frame considered here, the “capability” effect of specific pre-entry work experience, with a positive 
effect on a firm’s likelihood of survival, may be completely offset by an “alternative reason” for 
exit.
4 If this is the case, since highly specific experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to have 
based their start-ups on a valuable business project, they are also more likely than other type of 
entrepreneurs to alleviate industry crisis effects by finding some possible acquirers for their firm or 
other partners to merge with.  
In contrast, there is no evidence in the literature that work experience gained in different 
sectors  from  the  start-up  (i.e.,  generic  work  experience)  is  conducive  to  the  discovery  and 
exploitation of promising business opportunities in high-technology sectors.
5 It is generally found 
that generic work experience does not lead to superior firm performance (see, e.g., Bruderl and 
Preisendörfer 2000; Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2008). However, ceteris paribus, in the same vein as 
for the specific component, generic experience is associated with a high level of personal outside 
options for the entrepreneur. Hence, generic work experience is not necessarily associated with 
viable and profitable business projects, but it does increase the opportunity cost for the entrepreneur 
to run the start-up instead of following alternative options. Therefore, low economic value of the 
new start-up combined with high opportunity costs to keep the business running during recession 
might force entrepreneurs with a high level of generic experience to close their business because of   6 
an inability to find acquirers or partners; such an exit would allow them to use their time in more 
profitable activities. 
The above arguments lead to the formulation of the following initial hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H1. During an intense industry-specific recession, founders’ years of prior 
work experience may positively influence start-up exit. 
Conditional  upon  acceptance  of  H1,  the  following  two  other  hypotheses  on  the 
relationship between founders’ pre-entry work  experience  and the modes of firm exit are 
formulated: 
  Hypothesis H2a. Founders’ years of prior work experience in the same industry of the 
new firm are more positively associated with start-up exit via M&A. 
Hypothesis H2b. Founders’ years of prior work experience in another industry of the 




We consider a sample of 179 Italian ICT start-up companies that operate in service industries: 
multimedia  content,  software,  Internet  services  (e-commerce,  ISP,  web-related  services),  and 
telecommunication services. Sample firms were established between 1995 and the first quarter of 
2000 and were independent at start-up time (i.e., they  were not controlled by another business 
organisation).  The  sample  of  ICT  start-up  firms  was  extracted  from  the  RITA  (Research  on 
Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies) database developed at Politecnico di Milano.
6 The 
primary source of information from which RITA data were collected consists of a series of national 
surveys administered in the first semesters of the years 2000, 2002 and 2004. Data on sample firms 
come from the first round. The survey was based on a questionnaire that was sent to the contact 
person in the target firms (i.e., one of the owner-managers) either by fax or by e-mail. The first 
section of the questionnaire provides detailed information on the human capital characteristics of 
the firm’s founders. The second section comprises further questions concerning the characteristics 
of  the  firm,  including  the  year  of  foundation  and  the  dynamics  in  the  number  of  employees. 
Answers to the questionnaire were checked for internal coherence by trained personnel and were 
compared with information published in annual reports (as in the case of number of employees) and 
in  the  press.  In  several  cases,  phone  or  face-to-face  follow-up  interviews  were  conducted  with 
owner-managers to obtaining missing data and ensure that data were reliable. The eventual survival   7 
or exit from markets of sample firms between the second quarter of 2000 and 2003 was gathered in 
the second and third questionnaire rounds in 2002 and 2004. We collected information on sample 
firms being acquired or merged with other firms directly from the survey respondents. Data on firm 
closure and M&As for non-respondents were obtained from official documentation provided by the 
Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce.
7 Of the 179 sample firms, 55 (30.7%) did not survive 
over the period from early 2000 to 2003: 29 (16.2%) closed down operations and 26 (14.5%) were 
acquired by or (much more rarely) merged with other firms.
8 As to the 124 surviving firms (69.3%), 
information  is  available  on  whether  ICT  service  start-ups  experienced  some  changes  in  the 
composition of the entrepreneurial team during their lives (i.e., the leave of some founders and/or 
the addition of new owner-managers). Information on the relationship between founders’ pre-entry 
work experience and stability of the founding team along time will be exploited in the “Discussion” 
section in order to further validate the results of the survival analysis presented in this section. 
Finally, a caveat is in order on the use of the retrospective design here employed (similarly to 
Brüderl and Schussler 1990; Gimeno et al. 1997; Taylor 1999; Shane and Stuart 2002): lack of 
information on ICT services firms that were born and exited markets during the boom period limits 
our aim at investigating the determinants of ICT services firm exit under an industry recession 
(early 2000-2003) conditional upon survival in the boom period (1995-early 2000).  
 
Specification of the econometric analysis  
First, a probit model was estimated to investigate the relationship between variables of founder 
human capital and the probability of firm exit over the turmoil period from early 2000 to 2003. 
Then a bivariate probit model was used to distinguish the effects of human capital variables on the 
probability  of  closure  and  of  being  merged  or  acquired,  allowing  for  correction  terms  to  be 
interrelated. Since correlation was weak (i.e., the correlation parameter ρ between the error terms of 
the two equations was not statistically significant), two separate probit models were also estimated, 
one for closure and the other for M&A. Finally, as a robustness check, a multinomial probit was 
estimated  with  the  dependent  variable  that  takes  a  value  of  1  for  closure  and  2  for  M&A. 
Definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables and some descriptive statistics are reported 
in Table 1. Table 2 highlights the correlation matrix between the explanatory variables. Variables of 
founder human capital include: the size of the founding team (Founders); educational attainment 
(Education),  measured  by  the  mean  number  of  years  of  education  of  founders;  pre-entry  work 
experience gained in the same industry as the start-up company (Specific work experience), and in 
different  sectors  (Generic  work  experience),  both  measured  by  the  mean  number  of  years  of 
professional  experience  of  founders  before  firm  foundation;
9  and  managerial  experience   8 
(Managerial experience), which is a dummy variable capturing the presence within the founding 
team of one or more founders with a prior management position in a company. Strictly following 
the empirical literature on firm survival, models also include the following control variables: size 
measured in terms of logarithm of employees at the end of 1999 (Size),
10 age of the firm (Age) and 
access to external sources of financing at start-up time (Bank debt). Finally, an industry dummy 
variable (Internet) differentiates start-up companies active in Internet services (e-commerce, ISP, 
web-related services) from the others.  
 
Results 
Results are reported in Table 3. Size and Education show highly non-significant coefficients, 
while Managerial experience exerts a significant negative impact (90% level) on the probability of 
exit. More interestingly, founders’ pre-entry work experience exerts a significant positive effect on 
the probability of exit, confirming hypothesis H1: both Specific work experience and Generic work 
experience have a significant positive coefficient (at 95% and 90%, respectively). Further insights 
into the impact of previous work experience on firm exit are gained by distinguishing closure from 
M&A. The bivariate probit model specifies two different  equations for the two exit routes.  Its 
estimation highlights a negative, albeit non-significant, ρ coefficient, suggesting a weak negative 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations. Without any remarkable loss of efficiency, 
two  separate  probit  models  were  therefore  estimated.  Overall,  Specific  work  experience  has  a 
positive impact on the probability of ICT services firms being merged or acquired (at 90% and 95% 
in the bivariate and univariate probit models, respectively), but has no influence on the probability 
of closure. The opposite applies to Generic work experience, which has a significant positive impact 
on the probability of closure in both the bivariate (at 95%) and univariate probit (at 90%) models, 
but no significant coefficients for the M&A route.
11 Thus, both hypotheses H2a and H2b turn out to 
be confirmed. Based on the estimates of the closure probit equation, considering a three years-old 
Internet  company  established  by  two  individuals  having  minimum  values  of  pre-entry  work 
experience (equal to null), with all other variables at their mean value (median value for dummies), 
the probability of firm closure is 17.3%. The percentage almost doubles to 34.3%, for the same firm 
having  the  value  of  the  variable  Generic  work  experience  at  its  90
th  percentile  (equal  to  18). 
Analogously,  based on the estimates of the M&A probit equation, considering the same firm as 
before, the probability of M&A is 15.0%. The probability raises to 34.2% for an increase of the 
variable Specific work experience at its 90
th percentile (equal to 14). 
For the other variables of human capital, no significant patterns are apparent, except for the 
number  of  founders,  which  shows  a  weak  negative  influence  exclusively  on  firm  closure.   9 
Managerial experience, which has a significant negative impact on the probability of exit, loses this 
significance  when  the  type  of  exit  is  specified.  For  the  control  variables,  Bank  debt  exhibits 
significant  negative  correlation  (95%  level)  on  firm  exit,  while  Age  and  Size  are  highly  non-
significant. Again, further insights can be gained by distinguishing closure from M&A. In fact, 
while the impact of firm age continues to be non-significant,
12 the effect of Size on the probability 
of closure is significantly negative (90% level), while it is significantly positive (95% level) on 
M&A in both the bivariate and univariate probit specifications. This result confirms the highly 
different nature of exit via closure compared to M&A and suggests how sale to or the merger with 
other  firms  may  represent  a  rather  successful  exit  strategy  for  a  high-tech  start-up  firm.  The 
coefficient for Bank debt loses its significance for closure in the M&A equation, although it retains 
a negative sign.
13 Being a dot.com firm positively affects the probability of exit via both closure and 
M&A. 
Finally, the estimation results for the multinomial probit model are very similar to the findings 
highlighted  above,  speaking  in  favour  of  the  estimates  robustness.  In  terms  of  pre-entry  work 
experience, the Generic variable impacts closure but not M&A, and the opposite is observed for the 
Specific variable.  
 
Discussion 
Specific vs. generic work experience 
When things get tough do the tough get going? This empirical analysis based on a sample of 
Italian ICT start-up companies and their survival behaviour over the industry bust from early 2000 
to 2003 suggests a negative answer. Why can this happen? The reason can be found by considering 
the  two  opposite  forces  that  model  the  relationship  between  founders’  human  capital  and  firm 
survival (Gimeno et al. 1997). On the one hand, founders’ knowledge is the primary asset for start-
ups (Chandler and Hanks 1994; Peteraf and Shanley 1997; Reuber and Fischer 1999; van Praag 
2003) and a high level of founders’ human capital is likely to lead to a better firm, especially in 
high-tech industries (Cooper and Bruno 1997; Feeser and Willard 1990; Colombo and Grilli 2005). 
Ceteris paribus, this clearly implies a positive effect on a firm’s likelihood of survival. On the other 
hand, a high level of founder human capital raises the opportunity cost of running the firm instead 
of taking alternative employment options. When a very dramatic and specific industry crisis arises 
and  the  overall  industry  performance  declines,  the  latter  effect  may  well  dominate  the  former. 
However, the nature of the pre-entry work experience possessed by the founding team may shape 
which exit route is effectively available. Entrepreneurs characterised by a high level of generic 
work experience may be forced to close down operations because they cannot find acquirers or   10 
other firms to merge with. They have entered unknown markets in a boom period, possibly with 
expectations that are too optimistic or unprofitable business projects, and when “things get tough” 
they may revise downward their expectations (Jovanovic 1982, Ericson and Pakes 1995), finding 
convenient to switch to alternative occupations and giving up their business activity. Entrepreneurs 
characterised  by  a  high  level  of  specific  work  experience  are  more  likely  to  have  based  their 
entrepreneurial activity on a valuable business project (especially in high-tech sectors: e.g., Cooper 
and Bruno 1977; Cooper et al. 1994; Klepper 2001; Colombo and Grilli 2005). Accordingly, when 
“things get tough”, if they want to seize alternative options and possibly switch employment status, 
they  will  have  more  opportunities  to  find  possible  acquirers  and  other  firms  to  merge  with. 
Moreover, partners or acquirers may have the opportunity to exploit their level of specific pre-entry 
work experience if they are willing to continue working within the start-up firm.
14 Thus, in severe 
industry crises, founders characterised by low levels of both generic and specific work experience 
may be the most likely to resist in markets simply because they do not have any other options than 
keeping their businesses running. In this respect, these findings echo those of other studies that 
show how individuals facing low opportunity costs are more likely to become entrepreneurs (Amit 
et al. 1995) and to remain in business by their own (Gimeno et al. 1997). 
 
Founding team stability 
In order to further validate the possible relevance of “adverse selection” phenomena among ICT 
services entrepreneurs during the industry crisis, an analysis on founding team stability along time 
of the surviving sub-sample was run. Out of the 124 surviving firms, 72 were the firms at 2003 
which  did  not  experience  any  changes  in  the  entrepreneurial  team  from  the  original  founders  
(58.1%). A probit model was estimated in order to relate stability of the founding team to founders’ 
pre-entry  specific  and  generic  work  experience.  The  model  included  as  controls  all  the  other 
independent variables listed in Table 1. Results exposed in Table 4 highlight a negative relationship 
both of Specific work experience and Generic work experience with respect to the stability of the 
founding team (albeit only the latter one is statistically significant), with a joint significance of 90% 
(Wald test: χ
2(2)=4.78). In other words, founding teams characterised by a high level of pre-entry 
work experience are more likely to be subjected to some changes, while less experienced founding 
teams are relatively more stable. In the same vein, also Education shows a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (95% level). Quite reasonably, the age of the firm shows a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient (90% level) while Size exerts a positive albeit statistically weak 
impact on founding team stability. Finally, the variable Founders turns out to be negative although 
not  statistically  significant.  In  accordance  also  with  the  qualitative  evidence  we  collected,  this   11 
suggests that most changes consist in one founder leaving the team, an event which is more likely 
the larger the team. Additions of new owner-managers had appeared to be infrequent during ICT 
services industry recession. 
 
Conclusions 
The  relationship  between  founders’  human  capital  and  firm  survival  rates  is  complex  and 
multifaceted. This empirical analysis is based on a sample of Italian start-up companies created 
during the telecom boom from 1995 to early 2000 and operating in ICT services markets. Their exit 
behaviour is observed during the telecom bust from early 2000 to 2003. The analysis highlights that 
during an intense industry-specific recession, skilled and experienced entrepreneurs may pursue an 
exit strategy. In particular, founding teams with high levels of specific work experience show a 
higher probability of following the M&A route, while a higher level of generic work experience is 
associated with the closure option. Less experienced entrepreneurs may survive in markets simply 
because they do not have any other more profitable alternative. 
In the author’s view, these results are interesting as they extend our understanding of the link 
between founders’ human capital and  young high-tech firm survival and they also reveal some 
promising directions for future research. First, firm exit through closure may well differ from the 
M&A route (Gimeno et al. 1997). This distinction is most likely to be relevant in young high-tech 
industries such as ICT services, and has hardly been made in existing empirical work on the topic. 
More generally, founders’ human capital’s impact on firm exit is likely to change according to 
specific  measures  of  entrepreneurs’  experience  and  modes  of  exit  considered  (for  analogous 
conclusions see DeTienne and Cardon 2006). Second, the merely formal continuance of operations 
may be a poor proxy of young firm performance. Accordingly, generalisation of results about the 
impact of founders’ human capital on the survival prospects of young firms may be very risky, 
since findings can be very sensitive to a number of factors, such as measures of human capital, and 
industry-, time-, macroeconomic-specific conditions on which empirical analyses are based. Finally, 
anecdotal evidence indicating that talented ICT entrepreneurs aim at establishing viable start-ups, 
sell them and then do something else is in line with the results of this study. In this context, one 
interesting advance would be a more in-depth analysis of the career paths of founders after exit: 
whether they turn to labour market or continue the self-employment experience and how this choice 
is modelled by the different nature of their competencies and the different exit routes previously 
followed.  A  second  significant  research  progress  would  be  a  detailed  investigation  on 
entrepreneurs’ motivations to pursue the M&A route. In principle, two different stories may apply 
to the “M&A exit strategy” of high-skilled entrepreneurs in “though times”: one on which they   12 
leave any involvement in the acquired/merged firm and the other one where they continue to have 
an operative and/or a managerial role in the new organization. Discriminating between the two is a 
rather unexplored but extremely interesting issue for the entrepreneurship and managerial research 
fields since the implications in terms of survival chances of the original business idea may well 
differ under these two opposite scenarios. 
 
NOTES 
1 For an analogous periodisation (and description) of the telecom boom and bust, see Fransman (2004). 
2 The term “closure” here used includes voluntary closure, liquidation and bankruptcy; while merger and acquisition 
(M&A) refers exclusively to a firm being acquired or merged with other firms. In this latter category, we also include 
those start-ups that continue operations as separate entities but have lost their independence (i.e., became controlled by 
other business organizations). The distinction between generic and specific human capital is originally due to Becker 
(1975). As concerns work experience, see Colombo et al. (2004), Colombo and Grilli (2005) and (2008) for the same 
operazionalization of the two components as the one used here. See Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) for a slightly different 
empirical application in another context (i.e., “innovation radicalness”). 
3 “For a new, high-technology firm, the primary assets are the knowledge and skills of the founders. Any competitive 
advantage the new firm achieves is likely to be based upon what the founders can do better than others” (Cooper and 
Bruno 1977, p. 21; see also Feeser and Willard 1990, p. 88). 
4 Incidentally, note that besides a “capability” effect, a “wealth” effect may also be relevant. In fact, previous studies 
have  shown  a  positive  relationship  between  human  capital  and  the  wealth  of  individuals  (Xu  1998;  Åstebro  and 
Bernhardt 2005). It is generally thought that young high-technology firms established by wealthier individuals are less 
affected  by  financial  constraints  because  greater  personal  capital  is  available  to  finance  operations  and  avoid 
involuntary exit. See Carpenter and Petersen (2002) for an analysis of capital market imperfections affecting high-
technology start-ups and Colombo and Grilli (2007) for evidence regarding the Italian context. 
5 The study by Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) constitutes a partial exception insofar as it demonstrates that general human 
capital may lead entrepreneurs to introduce more radical innovations into markets. Unfortunately, the authors do not 
investigate the profitability of these innovations. 
6The RITA database represents the most complete database nowadays available on Italian new technology-based firms 
(NTBFs) collecting information on a population of 1974 NTBFs. See Colombo et al. (2004) and Colombo and Grilli 
(2005) for a detailed description of the database and the procedure used to gather data. As to sample representativeness, 
χ
2 tests show that there are no statistically significant differences between the distributions of sample firms across ICT 
services sectors and regions and the corresponding distribution of the RITA population of 793 ICT services start-ups 
from which the sample was obtained. 
7 The institution registers all business activities on the basis of  fiscal codes and provides (upon payment request) 
eventual exit information on firms along time. Note also that reliability of data on firm exit was checked by inspecting 
(when available) firms’ websites. 
8 Note that among sample firms only two went through an initial public offering (IPO) during the observation period. 
One after being already acquired by another firm and the other before acquisition. The exclusion of this latter from the 
analysis does not alter in any sensible way the results. 
9 As customary in empirical studies on the impact of human capital on firm performances (see, e.g., Colombo and Grilli 
2005, 2008), education and pre-entry work experience variables are introduced into models as “averages” instead of 
“total  sums”  across  founders.  This  specification,  which  also  includes  the  number  of  founders  as  an  independent 
variable, allows to disentangle the truly qualitative effect of human capital covariates from merely quantitative aspects. 
However note that replacing “average” education and work experience variables with the corresponding sums of the 
years of education and work experience of founders brings very similar results to those exposed in the next paragraph 
(results are available upon request from the author). 
 
10 Employment is commonly used as proxy for firm size in firm survival studies (see, e.g.,  Mata et al. 1995; Audtretsch 
et al. 1999; Esteve-Perez et al. 2004; Dunne et al. 2005; Esteve-Perez and Manez-Castillejo 2006; Strotmann 2007). 
Different measures such as total assets (e.g., Agarwal and Audtretsch 2001) or physical output (e.g., Thompson 2005) 
are less frequent. Note that the use of total amount of capital at foundation as an alternative measure of firm size brings 
very similar results (available upon request from the author) to those presented in the next paragraph.     13 
11 Model specifications including quadratic and interactive terms for founders’ pre-entry generic and specific work 
experience were also employed. Results highlight the absence of any statistically significant non linear and super-
additive effect on the probability of firm exit both via closure and M&A. Tests for the presence of concave or convex 
relationships between age and size, from one side, and the probability of exit (again for both exit modes) from the other 
one, were also run. Again these quadratic terms turn out to be always statistically insignificant. Finally, note that we 
also check if results on the impact of pre-entry work experience on firm exit were simply driven by the old age of some 
founders willing to retire.  As to this aspect,  entrepreneurs are on average young (the mean age of the founding teams is 
34.7 years old), and the exclusion from the analysis of the two sample firms with a relatively “old founding team” (aged 
on average over 57 years), leaves all the findings here presented almost unchanged. All results are available upon 
request from the author.  
12 For a non-significant coefficient for the age variable once firm size and pre-entry work experience are taken into 
consideration, see also Thompson (2005). Also consider that all sample firms are less than five years old so they all 
potentially suffer from a “liability of newness” effect (Stinchcombe 1965). 
13 For a positive relationship between  having a bank loan at start-up time and the survival chances of  new small 
businesses,  see  also  Åstebro  and  Bernhardt  (2003).  In  this  respect,  having  a  bank  loan  would  reveal  a  greater 
commitment by entrepreneurs in running the new venture and a consequent superior reluctance of their firms to exit 
markets. 
14    Note however that our analytical framework does not enable us to disentangle who is better off between the two 
types of individuals after firm exit. From one side, highly specific experienced entrepreneurs may gain financial returns 
by selling their start-up. On the other side, highly generic experienced entrepreneurs have more possibilities to invest 
their effort in activities outside the industry under crisis and consequently they might end up at least in the short term 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 – Definition of dependent and explanatory variables 
Dependent 
variables 
Description  Mean  S.D. 
Exit  Value of 1 for firms that did not survive between early 2000 and 2003  0.307  0.467 
Closure  Value of 1 for firms that discontinued operations between early 2000 and 2003  0.162  0.369 
M&A  Value of 1 for firms that have been acquired by or merged with other firms 
between early 2000 and 2003 
0.145  0.353 
Explanatory 
variables 
Description  Mean  S.D. 
Founders  Number of founders  2.888  1.741 
Education  Average number of years of education of founders  15.096  2.386 
Specific work 
experience 
Average number of years of work experience of founders in the same sector of 
the start-up before firm’s foundation 
3.754  6.742 
Generic work 
experience 
Average number of years of work experience of founders in sectors other than 
that of the start-up before firm’s foundation  7.855  7.784 
Managerial 
experience 
Value of 1  for firms  with one or  more  founders  with a  prior management 
position in a company 
0.257  0.438 
Size  Logarithm of number of employees  at the end of 1999  1.386  1.050 
Bank debt  Value of 1 for firms which have obtained a bank debt at firm’s foundation  0.162  0.369 
Age  Number of years from 2000 to firm’s foundation  3.201  1.552 
Internet  Value of 1 for firms operating in Internet services (e-commerce, ISP, web-
related services) 
0.687  0.465 
Legend. Number of observations is 179. 
 
 
Table 2 –Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables of the econometric models 
         Legend. Number of observations is 179. 








Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
1. Founders  1.000                 
2. Education  0.023  1.000               
3. Specific work experience  -0.134  -0.005  1.000             
4. Generic work experience  -0.029  -0.063  -0.419  1.000           
5. Managerial experience   0.104  0.066  0.233  0.111  1.000         
6. Size  0.059  0.198  0.079  0.050  0.173  1.000       
7. Bank debt  -0.198  -0.040  0.090  -0.095  -0.119  -0.056  1.000     
8. Age  0.118  -0.098  -0.078  -0.123  -0.357  0.069  0.011  1.000   
9. Internet  -0.043  -0.096  -0.095  0.001  0.093  0.118  -0.030  -0.154  1.000   19 
Table 3 – Determinants of firm exit via closure and M&A 
  Model  Probit   Bivariate Probit  Probit  Probit  Multinomial Probit 
                 
  Dependent variable  Exit  Closure  M&A  Closure  M&A  Closure =1  M&A =2 
a0  Constant  -1.580 (0.867)*  -0.596 (0.944)  -3.279 (0.957)***  -0.579 (0.973)  -3.441 (0.942)***  -1.304 (1.387)  -4.487 (1.334)*** 
a1  Founders  -0.049 (0.081)  -0.203 (0.100)**  0.024 (0.083)  -0.166 (0.092)*  0.027 (0.084)  -0.212 (0.126)*  0.006 (0.122) 
a2  Education  0.022 (0.044)  -0.006 (0.046)  0.044 (0.046)  -0.011 (0.048)  0.056 (0.048)  0.002 (0.069)  0.081 (0.069) 
a3  Specific work experience  0.044 (0.018)**  0.019 (0.020)  0.044 (0.023)*  0.016 (0.021)  0.045 (0.020)**  0.045 (0.030)  0.075 (0.028)*** 
a4  Generic work experience  0.029 (0.015)*  0.031 (0.016)**  0.010 (0.016)  0030 (0.017)*  0.009 (0.018)  0.047 (0.024)*  0.030 (0.026) 
a5  Management experience  -0.466 (0.271)*  -0.087 (0.320)  -0.419 (0.351)  -0.132 (0.319)  -0.480 (0.351)  -0.376 (0.432)  -0.774 (0.481) 
a6  Size  0.068 (0.105)  -0.251 (0.130)*  0.274 (0.124)**  -0.217 (0.128)*  0.286 (0.127)**  -0.185 (0.175)  0.318 (0.175)* 
a7  Bank debt  -0.665 (0.311)**  -0.441 (0.365)  -0.566 (0.374)  -0.407 (0.361)  -0.635 (0.390)  -0.742 (0.498)  -1.060 (0.545)* 
a8  Age  -0.041 (0.078)  -0.093 (0.097)  0.094 (0.100)  -0.095 (0.094)  0.080 (0.092)  -0.117 (0.128)  0.058 (0.125) 
a9  Internet  0.973 (0.266)***  0.794 (0.319)**  0.855 (0.300)***  0.718 (0.306)**  0.873 (0.299)**  1.222 (0.425)***  1.442 (0.425)*** 
  ρ  -  -0.990 (1.545)  -  -  - 
               
  Log-likelihood function  -96.595  -125.039  -69.262  -62.458  -126.116 
  Wald test (χ
2)  25.15 (9)***  122.92 (18)***  23.70 (9)***  29.59 (9)***  54.41 (18)*** 
  Efron’ pseudo R
2 
0.16  -  0.13  0.16  - 
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Table 4 – Founders’ pre-entry work experience and founding team stability 
  Model  Probit  
     
  Dependent variable  No change in the founding team = 1 
a0  Constant  2.900 (1.069)*** 
a1  Founders  -0.074 (0.078) 
a2  Education  -0.106 (0.052)** 
a3  Specific work experience  -0.014 (0.025) 
a4  Generic work experience  -0.042 (0.020)** 
a5  Management experience  -0.090 (0.312) 
a6  Size  0.143 (0.134) 
a7  Bank debt  0.123 (0.303) 
a8  Age  -0.160 (0.091)* 
a9  Internet  -0.258 (0.265) 
     
  Log-likelihood function  -78.325 
  Wald test (χ
2): a3 = a4=0  4.78 (2)* 
  Efron’ pseudo R
2 
0.10 
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Figure 1 – Founders’ pre-entry work experience and firm exit: a heuristic model 
 
 
Legend: H1: During an intense industry-specific recession, founders’ years of prior work experience may positively 
influence start-up exit; H2a: Founders’ years of prior work experience in the same industry of the new firm are more 
positively associated with start-up exit via M&A; H2b: Founders’ years of prior work experience in another industry of 
the new firm are more positively associated with start-up exit via closure of operations. 
 
 
 
 
 